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Protecting Privacy and Free Speech in Cyberspace
NADINE STROSSEN*
I. INCREASING TENSIONS BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREE SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE
The last time Jeff Rosen and I participated in a symposium together-in May
of 2000-the topic, significantly, was the same as that I was assigned in this
program-to comment on the relationship between privacy and free speech. The
earlier symposium, sponsored by the Columbia Journalism School, was entitled
When Rights Collide: Privacy & the First Amendment. It is an honor and a
challenge to revisit my thoughts about the complex and important relationship
between privacy and First Amendment rights after having read Jeff Rosen's
insightful book.
As indicated by the title of the Columbia program, there can be difficult
conflicts between privacy and First Amendment rights, but the relationship
between these two sets of rights is more complicated and variable. For many
years now, this interrelationship has been the focus of occasional attention in the
context of particular situations that have raised tensions. With the advent of
cyber-communications, this interrelationship has escalated in importance. It has
become a matter of constant, urgent concern, as indicated by the increasing
number of laws and lawsuits in which it is a focal point. For example, this
interrelationship underlay two Supreme Court cases that were decided during
the last Term,' and was again at stake in a major case on the Court's docket for
the present Term.:
As The Unwanted Gaze so vividly illustrates, our new technologies have
dramatically increased the ease of retrieving, compiling, and disseminating
* President, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Professor of Law, New York Law School.
For research and administrative assistance, I gratefully acknowledge my academic assistant, Kathy
Davis, and research assistants Judith Krauss, April Myers, and Janice Purvis. Most of the credit and
responsibility for the footnotes go to these individuals, as well as to the editors of The Georgetown Law
Journal.
1. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (upholding federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994,
which restricts disclosure of information collected by state departments of motor vehicles); Los Angeles
Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) (rejecting facial First Amendment
challenge, brought by a publishing company, to a state statute barring law enforcement agencies from
disclosing information about arrested individuals to anyone who would use the information to sell a
product or service). In Condon, the Supreme Court rejected the State's argument that the Act violated
federalism principles; the Court did not address arguments, which had been asserted by intervenor
media organizations in the lower courts, that the Act violated First Amendment principles. Because the
district court held the statute unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment, see Condon v. Reno, 972 E
Supp. 977, 979 n.3 (D.S.D. 1999), the Court did not address the First Amendment issue. The appellate
court declined to address the First Amendment issue because the district court had not considered it. See
Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 456 n.1 (4th Cir. 1998).
2. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753 (2001) (holding that media defendants who disclosed a cell
phone conversation that had been illegally intercepted could not be subject to civil liability consistent
with the First Amendment, when the media defendants had obtained the communications lawfully and
the intercepted conversation concerned a matter of public interest).
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information that many people regard as highly personal, and therefore want to
preserve as private. This change is so dramatic that many consider it to be a
change not just in degree, but also in kind. Many privacy advocates see this as a
technological revolution that calls for a corresponding legal revolution to
provide new protection for personal data.
Just as cyberspace at least arguably has transformed privacy concerns regard-
ing personal data, the same is true for the corresponding free speech concerns.
Privacy advocates have argued that the right to disseminate information-
including personal, sensitive information-has been premised on a concept of a
responsible, professional press, exercising self-restraint as a matter of journalis-
tic ethics. Now, however, literally anyone and everyone can "Drudge" up (so to
speak) the most intimate information-or disinformation-and spread it world-
wide instantaneously. 3 And, the argument goes, these Internet gossips do not
deserve the First Amendment protections that previously had been extended to,
say, the New York Times.
In sum, some privacy proponents maintain that previous Supreme Court cases
pitting the press versus privacy, in which the press consistently has prevailed,4
should not necessarily govern cyberspace. These cases might have come out
differently if the defendant had not been an established, traditional media outlet.
Regardless of whether one agrees that this should be so, it certainly is true that
each of the pertinent Supreme Court rulings concerning press versus privacy is
intensely fact-specific, carefully limited to the particular circumstances, and an
ad hoc weighing of the competing privacy and free speech concerns under those
specific circumstances.5 Therefore, it surely is possible that any change in the
underlying facts presented by the earlier cases-including the changes wrought
by cyberspace-could well change the legal analysis and outcome.
3. See, e.g., THE DRUDGE REPORT, at http://www.drudgereport.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2001).
4. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding that the First Amendment does not permit Florida
to punish a newspaper for publishing the name of a rape victim that the paper had obtained from a
police report); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (holding unconstitutional a West
Virginia statute that made it a crime for a newspaper to publish, without the written approval of the
juvenile court, the name of a child charged as a juvenile offender); Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (holding that Virginia could not constitutionally punish a newspaper for
publishing truthful information regarding confidential proceedings of the state's Judicial Inquiry and
Review Commission); Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam) (vacating as
unconstitutional a pretrial order enjoining a newspaper from publishing the name or picture of an
eleven-year-old boy on trial for second-degree murder); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975) (holding unconstitutional a civil damage award against a television station for broadcasting the
name of a rape victim in violation of a law that prohibited the publication of the victim's name).
5. The Supreme Court has refused a media company's "invitation to hold broadly that truthful
publication may never be punished consistent with the First Amendment." Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 532.
The Court explained: "Our cases have carefully eschewed reaching this ultimate question, mindful that
the future may bring scenarios which prudence counsels our not resolving anticipatorily.... We
continue to believe that the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes between
First Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly
than the appropriate context of the instant case." Id. at 532-33.
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On the other hand, some free speech advocates have argued that free speech
concerns should continue to trump privacy concerns, and that increased legal
protection for data privacy would violate fundamental First Amendment prin-
ciples. They contend that any such protection could not be cabined to the
particular facts of the online world, but instead would require a radical revision
and evisceration of free speech rights in general. This perspective was power-
fully advanced, for example, by UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh in yet
another symposium in which Jeff Rosen and I both participated earlier this year
(along with Peter Swire and others from this Symposium) at Stanford Law
School.6 Professor Volokh's analysis is well captured in the title of his Stanford
Law Review article, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You. 7 I should note
that Volokh's analysis garnered some impressive critiques,' including one by
Georgetown law professor Julie Cohen, a co-panelist today.9 A few years earlier,
the same perspective as Volokh's was advanced by Solveig Singleton, Director
of Information Studies at the Cato Institute. The title of her piece phrases the
pro-speech perspective even more starkly: Privacy as Censorship: A Skeptical
View of Proposals to Regulate Privacy in the Private Sector.'°
II. CONTINUING PosrIVE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREE SPEECH
Thus far, I have focused on the tensions between free speech and privacy.
Before commenting further about that conflict, though, an offsetting observation
is in order. In many situations, these two sets of rights are mutually reinforcing.
Indeed, in some cases, First Amendment rights could not even exist without
privacy rights. In fact, prominent champions of free speech rights have viewed
privacy as the ultimate bedrock of all our civil liberties, including our First
Amendment rights. Notable examples here include two Supreme Court Justices
who were among the Court's foremost free speech absolutists: Justices Louis
Brandeis and William 0. Douglas."
For example, Brandeis famously called privacy "the most comprehensive"
and "most valued" right. 12 And, of course, along with Samuel Warren, Brandeis
6. See Symposium, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 987 (2000).
7. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a
Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000).
8. See, e.g., Paul Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: Eugene Volokh's First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559 (2000).
9. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L.
REv. 1373 (2000)
10. SOLVEIG SINGLETON, PRIVACY AS CENSORSHIP: A SKEPTICAL VIEW OF PROPOSALS TO REGULATE
PRIVACY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR (Cato Inst. Policy Analysis No. 295, 1998), available at http://
www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-295.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2001).
11. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, The Religion Clause Writings of Justice William 0. Douglas, in HE
SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAIN: THE LEGACY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 91, 94-95 (Stephen L. Wasby
ed., 1990).
12. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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is the initiator of the whole modem concept of legally protected data privacy. 13
It is important to keep this positive relationship between free speech and
privacy in mind. Despite specific situations where there is an apparent conflict
between free speech and privacy rights, all of us who value free speech have a
real stake in preserving a robust privacy right as well.
There are a number of important specific areas where these two sets of rights
are directly reinforcing. I would like to mention a couple of these where the
ACLU is very active right now. One example is the whole area of anonymous or
pseudonymous communications, including those communications that take place
online. The Supreme Court consistently has upheld the right to engage in such
confidential communications, most recently in an Ohio case the ACLU won a
few years ago, involving anonymous leaflets that our client distributed about a
local school bond contest.' 4 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission is just the
latest in a line of cases going back a half-century. In the 1950s and 1960s, the
Court struck down several state and local laws that required the NAACP to
disclose its membership lists. 15 In all these cases, the Court has recognized that
without the cloak of anonymity, many individuals simply will not exercise their
First Amendment rights. They will not freely associate with controversial
organizations, nor will they express controversial ideas or discuss sensitive
subjects. Consequently, the Court consistently has upheld the right to communi-
cations privacy, and it has expressly grounded that right in the First Amendment
itself. In these contexts, far from being inherently antithetical to the First
Amendment, privacy is to the contrary an essential aspect of, or predicate for,
First Amendment freedoms. The Unwanted Gaze stresses that Jewish law
recognizes this mutually supportive connection between privacy and free speech,
noting that "[f]rom its earliest days, Jewish law recognized that ... the uncer-
tainty about whether or not we are being observed.., forces us to lead more
constricted lives and inhibits us fiom speaking.. . freely in private places."'
16
The ACLU is continuing to defend these longstanding combined privacy and
First Amendment rights in the new setting of cyberspace across a range of
circumstances. For instance, in ACLU v. Miller,17 we persuaded a federal court
to strike down a Georgia law that criminalized anonymous or pseudonymous
online communications. The plaintiff individuals and organizations we repre-
sented all were concerned that the law would prohibit them, at risk of jail or
fines, from using pseudonyms to protect their privacy, communicate sensitive
information, and shield themselves from harassment that could likely result if
their identities were known on the Internet. For instance, the Atlanta Veterans
Alliance, a Georgia-based organization for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgen-
13. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
14. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
15. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
16. JEFFREY RosEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 19 (2000).
17. ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D: Ga. 1997).
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dered veterans, feared the law could lead to disclosure of the identity of its
members who remain in active military service. Such disclosure would likely
end their military careers.
Some plaintiffs expressed the further concern that loss of online anonymity
would put others at risk, not only themselves. For example, plaintiff Commu-
nity ConneXion, an Internet service provider, specializes in providing the
highest level of privacy to online users. The group developed a service known
as "Anonymizer," which enables any Internet user to browse and retrieve
documents anonymously. According to its President, Sameer Parekh, organiza-
tions and individuals around the world use Community ConneXion's services to
protect them online from oppressive governments, harassment, and invasive
marketing databases. He feared that the Georgia law would force Community
ConneXion to choose between shutting down its services or risking prosecu-
tion. 18
In many other cases, the ACLU has defended anonymous online speakers
against legal intimidation from those they criticize in cyberspace. For example,
in February 2001, the ACLU (together with the Electronic Frontier Foundation)
asked the federal court in Seattle, Washington to quash a subpoena that would
force an Internet service provider to disclose the identity of a person who spoke
anonymously on an Internet bulletin board. Moreover, in that same month, the
ACLU submitted its appellate brief in Melvin v. Doe,'9 a challenge to a
Pennsylvania judge's attempt to use the courts to try to ferret out the identity of
an online critic. 20 The ACLU press release about these recent cases underscores
the mutually reinforcing relationship between privacy--or anonymity-and free
speech in much of our cyberliberties work, noting that "in many of the [online]
defamation cases the ACLU has handled, individuals felt their speech was
'chilled' by the threat of a lawsuit-often brought by deep-pockets corporations
or powerful individuals-and by the threat of disclosure."2'
Another illustration of mutually interdependent privacy and free speech rights
in cyberspace involves encryption. Absent secure cryptography, many individu-
als and organizations simply will not engage in many kinds of online communi-
cations involving sensitive information. In several cases, we have argued, and
some judges have held, that encryption code itself constitutes a form of commu-
nication that is protected under the First Amendment.22
18. Press Release, ACLU, Groups Challenge Georgia Law Restricting Free Speech (Sept. 24, 1996),
http://www.aclu.org/news/n092496a.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2001).
19. Brief for Appellant, Melvin v. Doe, No. 2116 WDA 2000 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001), available at
http://www.aclu.org/court/melvinappeal.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2001).
20. Press Release, ACLU, In Two Significant Cases, ACLU Seeks to Protect Anonymous Online
Speakers from Legal Intimidation (Feb. 26, 2001), http://www.aclu.org/news/2001/nO22601b.html (last
visited Mar. 18, 2001).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000); Bernstein v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir.), withdrawn and reh'g granted, 192 F.3d. 1308 (9th Cir. 1999). But see
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The Unwanted Gaze discusses yet another context in which privacy and free
speech rights are mutually reinforcing: when governments mandate blocking
software to deny access to certain online material, requiring individuals who
seek access to obtain special permission from government officials.2 3 One
especially egregious law of this sort was passed by the Commonwealth of
Virginia, denying access to sexually explicit materials on any state-owned
computer equipment. On behalf of professors at various state universities in
Virginia, the ACLU challenged this law, contending that it violated free speech
rights to access information pertinent to the professors' research, writing, and
teaching on subjects ranging from anthropology to women's studies. 24 More-
over, we contended that this law violated privacy rights because it required
anyone seeking access to the blocked material to obtain approval from the head
of the pertinent governmental agency, and any such request was subject to
public disclosure under the state freedom of information act. As the lower court
judge concluded, this disclosure requirement certainly had the effect-and
probably also the purpose-of deterring efforts to seek the blocked words and
images. In short, the denial of privacy perpetuated and exacerbated the denial of
First Amendment freedoms.2 5
In March 2001, the ACLU challenged a federal statute scheduled to go into
effect in April 2001 that is similar to the Virginia blocking law, but with even
more sweeping adverse consequences for both privacy and free speech rights.2 6
The Children's Internet Protection Act (CHIPA) 27 mandates blocking software
on all computers in all public libraries that receive certain federal support. 28 The
statute permits librarians to temporarily disable blocking software during com-
puter use by some patrons who can show a "bona fide research purpose. 2 9
However, as the ACLU's complaint alleges, our "library plaintiffs do not
know ... how the exception could be applied without violating our patrons'
privacy and anonymity rights, contrary to the longstanding practices and poli-
cies of the library community. ,30 Accordingly, the complaint alleges that "CHIPA
violates the First Amendment right to communicate anonymously and privately
Kam v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996), remanded per curiam by 107 F3d
923 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
23. RosEN, supra note 16, at 86-87.
24. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 995 F Supp. 634, 635 (E.D. Va. 1998), rev'd en banc, 216 F.3d 401 (4th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 759 (2001).
25. See id. at 642. See generally Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at
"Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 981 (1996).
26. Complaint, Multnomah County Pub. Library v. United States, No. 01CV1322 (E.D. Pa. filed
Mar. 20, 2001), available at http://www.aclu.org/court/multnomah.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2001).
27. Children's Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (to be codified in
scattered titles of U.S.C.).
28. Children's Internet Protection Act §§ 1712, 1721(b), 114 Stat. at 2763A-340 to -341, -346 to
-347 (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 9134 and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)).
29. §1712(a)(2), 114 Stat. at 2763A-341.
30. Complaint 130, Multnomah County (No. 01CV1322).
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because it requires adults to prove to government officials that they have a
'bona fide research purpose' before accessing protected speech.'
Another interconnected set of privacy and free speech rights that CHIPA
violates is illustrated by another ACLU client in our challenge to that new
blocking law, fifteen-year-old Emmalyn Rood. Ms. Rood is a patron of the
Multnomah County Public Library in Portland, Oregon. The complaint explains
why her intertwined privacy and free speech rights-and those of similarly
situated individuals-are violated by government-imposed blocking software,
which would likely block websites concerning gay and lesbian sexual orienta-
tion:
Within the last two years, [Ms. Rood] began conducting research at the
Multnomah County Library in order to explore her sexual orientation after
thinking she might be a lesbian. Although her family has Internet access at
home, she did not want to perform this sensitive and personal research from
her family computer, for fear her mother would discover her private re-
search. She... used.., web sites.., and interactive Internet resources such
as e-mail. Through these resources .... Ms. Rood was able to learn more
about her sexual orientation, and connect with a friendly, welcoming queer
community on line. Due to the information and support she received, Ms.
Rood has since come out as a lesbian to her family and community.
32
As I stated at the outset, the relationship between privacy and First Amend-
ment rights is complex. In that vein, I recognize that even the situations I have
just described, involving mutually reinforcing relationships between privacy
and free speech rights, do not involve simply or exclusively reinforcing relation-
ships. To the contrary, even in these situations, the relationships among free
speech and privacy concerns is more complex. So far, in describing these
scenarios, I have only stressed the speakers'--or potential speakers'---concern
with confidentiality as an incentive for encouraging their communicative activi-
ties. Of course, though, there are other, countervailing First Amendment con-
cerns-namely, access to information and disseminating that information. The
public and journalists acting on the public's behalf have a legitimate concern in
finding out who is distributing handbills in connection with an election, who is
joining and supporting a controversial organization, and who is communicating
sensitive information online or off. Accordingly, even in these situations, there
is at least some tension between First Amendment and privacy concerns.
Moreover, we are witnessing many other situations where the tension between
these rights is even more pointed-and painful. The tension is painful because
I-and the ACLU-have an absolutist view of both sets of rights. We have an
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I11. BALANCING THE COMPETING CONSIDERATIONS IN EACH CONTEXT
The interrelationship between privacy and free speech is very challenging for
yet another reason: It encompasses so many different specific questions, each at
least arguably calling for a somewhat varying analysis. Let me list just some of
these questions, many of which are discussed in The Unwanted Gaze and have
been raised by recent news events, public debates, laws, and lawsuits:
" When are sexual and other personal matters legitimate topics of public
inquiry? How about health? Mental health?
" When may the press fairly cover the personal lives of those who are
related to public figures?
" What about "outing" closeted gay men and lesbians in public positions?
" Should there be different standards for celebrities who are not public
officials?
" What about someone who is involuntarily thrust into the limelight-for
example, the survivor of a disaster?
" What about someone who is suspected of a crime, but not yet charged?
* What are the privacy rights of a crime victim (or alleged victim)? What
are the privacy rights of crime victims in sensitive cases-for example,
sexual assaults or when the victims are juveniles?
" How do we protect ourselves against unwanted intrusions into our
homes and lives through such means as "spam" e-mail, without unduly
restricting speech?
" Should we allow websites to post home addresses, telephone numbers,
and other personally identifying information about abortion providers?
What about information concerning their children?
33
" What about similar information concerning former sex offenders?
" What restrictions should be imposed on the collection and dissemination
of personally identifying information by journalists or other private
sector actors?
" What if the information has been collected by the government-for
example, drivers' license information or census data? What restrictions,
if any, should be imposed on private actors' access to such government-
compiled records?
" Should different access rights and restrictions apply for, say, journalists
or academic researchers, as opposed to marketers? If so, what about
marketers of legal services-in other words, lawyers?
34
33. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Amer. Coalition of Life Activists, 2001 WL 293260 (9th
Cir. Mar. 28, 2001), aff'd, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1156 (D. Or. 1999).
34. See Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999). In United
Reporting, the Supreme Court overturned an injunction against enforcement of a state statute barring
law enforcement agencies from disclosing information about arrested individuals to anyone who would
in turn use that information to sell a product or service, but did allow disclosure of addresses of
2110 [Vol. 89:2103
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With respect to all of the foregoing situations, or any others posing compet-
ing free speech and privacy concerns, some advocates and analysts automati-
cally or presumptively prefer one set of rights. For example, some media
organizations automatically advocate the free speech concerns in each of these
situations-and that is appropriate, consistent with their organizational mission.
Conversely, some pro-privacy organizations automatically-and appropriately-
advocate the countervailing privacy concerns in every such situation.
The ACLU is caught in the middle because we consider both sets of rights to
be equally compelling. We are therefore forced to do what the courts are also
forced to do in each of these situations-to engage in a careful, fact-specific
analysis and weighing of the competing rights in each particular context. When
it comes to civil liberties, I-and the ACLU-usually oppose ad hoc balancing
tests because they can easily degenerate into letting the rights be balanced out of
existence.35 However, I cannot conceive of any alternative when it comes to
conflicts between two compelling sets of rights. Any categorical approach that
presumptively preferred one set of rights would lead to presumptive violations
of the other set of rights.
Let me list some of the factors that should be considered in weighing the
competing privacy and free speech concerns in each specific situation:
* the subjective expectations of privacy about the information involved;
* the objective expectations of privacy about the information involved;
* the degree of public interest in the information;
* any explicit or implicit assurances of confidentiality concerning the
information;
* whether any important purpose that disclosing the information could
serve could instead be served through alternative measures that would
impinge less on privacy;
" how effective any restrictions on disclosing the information actually are
in protecting privacy; and
arrestees and crime victims "for a scholarly, journalistic, political, or governmental purpose, or... for
investigation purposes by a licensed private investigator." Id. at 35. The challenge was brought by a
publishing company that had provided names and addresses of recently arrested individuals to
attorneys, drug and alcohol counselors, and driving schools. The district court and the Ninth Circuit had
held this selective disclosure an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech. Id. at 36-37. The
Court, however, treated the case as presenting only a facial challenge to the law, thereby sidestepping
the issue of the law's allegedly discriminatory application. See id. at 37. But note Justice Stevens's
dissent: "A... likely, rationale that might explain the restriction is the State's desire to prevent lawyers
from soliciting law business from unrepresented defendants. This interest is arguably consistent with
trying to uphold the ethics of the legal profession. Also at stake here, however, are the important
interests of allowing lawyers to engage in protected speech and potentially giving criminal defendants
better access to needed professional assistance .... Ultimately, this state interest must fail because at its
core it relies on discrimination against disfavored speech." Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35. See generally Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the
Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173 (1988).
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* any alternative privacy-protecting measures that would infringe less on
free speech rights.
In some cases, the balancing is quite straightforward, and one set of concerns-
either free speech or privacy-is clearly predominant over the other. In other
cases, the balancing process is very difficult, and reasonable civil libertarians
can, and do, disagree with each other (and even remain conflicted ourselves,
within our own minds!). To illustrate this balancing process, I will describe the
ACLU's analysis and resulting positions in several recent situations.
In 1999, the ACLU won a case in the Supreme Court in which, unusually,
many media companies filed briefs on the other side. In Wilson v. Layne,3 6 the
ACLU sued law enforcement officials who brought a Washington Post reporter
and photographer along with them when they executed a search warrant in our
clients' home. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with us that this violated
our clients' privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment. I want to stress that we
did not sue the Washington Post, nor did we claim that the journalists them-
selves had violated our clients' legal rights.37 (In contrast, in similar situations,
other litigants have sought to hold the media directly accountable.) Still, the
media companies opposed our position-as well as the Court's ruling-because
they did not want police to be deterred from inviting media to observe their law
enforcement activities, including the execution of search warrants.38 While The
Unwanted Gaze does not extensively discuss the tensions between privacy and
free speech, its two references to that topic are consistent with both the general
balancing approach that the ACLU has followed (along with the Supreme
Court), as well as with the specific outcome in Wilson v. Layne.39
Now I will turn from the foregoing privacy-versus-free-speech situation, in
which the ACLU (along with the Supreme Court) struck the balance in favor of
privacy, to another recent instance in which we struck a different balance. I am
36. 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (holding that police violate homeowners' Fourth Amendment rights when
police allow the media to accompany them during executions of search warrants).
37. Id.
38. See Brief Amici Curiae of ABC, Inc. et al, Wilson (No. 98-93), available at 1998 WL 901781.
39. See Rosen, supra note 16, at 41-42. Rosen states that
[i]n a society that respects the freedom of the press.... the solution to... privacy invasions
isn't to prohibit journalists from publishing information they have obtained from police or
prosecutors. Instead, courts should prohibit police or prosecutors from sharing certain private
information with the press. Some courts have recognized that the reasonableness of a search
or seizure may turn on how widely the police publicize the information after they have
obtained it.
Id. He also writes that
despite the tragic personal consequences that often result from the disclosure of true but
embarrassing private facts, it's appropriate, in a country that takes the First Amendment
seriously, that invasion of privacy suits against the press rarely succeed, except in truly -lurid
cases of hidden camera investigations that transgress the bounds of civilized behavior.
Id. at 48.
2112 [Vol. 89:2103
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND FREE SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE
referring to the debate about the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act.4 °
During the summer of 2000, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) implemented
the proposed rules, which were. ostensibly designed to protect children's online
privacy,4' but which we, along with the Center for Democracy & Technology,
opposed because their actual impact was to stifle children's freedom to commu-
nicate over the Internet. In a nutshell, the law requires certain websites that
intentionally collect personal information from young children to get parental
consent before doing so. 42 We consider this an appropriate protection of chil-
dren's-and parents'-privacy rights. The FTC's proposed regulations, how-
ever, go much further. They require websites to get verifiable parental consent
before allowing children to engage in any online expression, even if the sites do
not seek to collect personal information from the children.43 In short, this rule
has the effect of depriving children of the uniquely interactive features of online
expression, relegating them to the role of passive viewer and converting the
computer screen, in effect, to a TV screen.
I should note that the ACLU is also concerned about the rights of older
minors to gain access to important online information they might not seek if
they cannot maintain confidentiality vis-A-vis their parents-for example, infor-
mation about contraception, abortion, safer-sex, or lesbian and gay sexuality.
Moreover, some young people may well be deterred from seeking out certain
political, religious, or cultural information if their parents are aware that they
are doing so. In short, while laws requiring parental consent are billed as
protecting minors' privacy, in some significant ways such laws actually under-
mine their privacy (as well as their free speech rights).
One more specific case pitting free speech against privacy is of special
interest because the Supreme Court has agreed to review it during its 2000
Term. Factually, this case does not directly involve cyber-communications, but
it does involve another relatively new communications technology--cell
phones-and it has important implications for cyberspace. The case, Bartnicki
v. Vopper,44 involves an illegal interception of a cell phone conversation that
was then broadcast by media outlets that did not participate in any way, even
indirectly, in the illegal interception. Bartnicki raises essentially the same issues
that are presented by a higher profile case that is still working its way through
the lower courts, involving an illegal interception of a telephone conference call
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6505 (2000).
41. Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.1-.12 (2001).
42. See id. § 312.3.
43. Id.
44. The Supreme Court issued its decision shortly before this Article went to press, Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753 (2001). Affirming the Third Circuit's ruling that the First Amendment
immunized media defendants from civil liability for disclosing an illegally intercepted cell phone
conversation, the majority stressed the fact-specific nature of its ruling, which turned on a balance
between the particular privacy and free speech concerns at issue.
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among Congressman John Boehner and other members of the Republican
House leadership, including then-Speaker Newt Gingrich.45
The challenge of weighing the competing privacy and free speech concerns in
these two cases is underscored by the fact that the lower court judges have been
deeply divided in both cases, with votes of two-to-one on both appellate court
panels. Moreover, in the case that the Supreme Court is reviewing, both the
majority and dissenting opinions were written by staunch civil libertarians with
solid track records in support of both free speech and privacy rights. The
majority opinion, which came down in favor of the free speech concerns, was
written by Dolores Sloviter, former Chief Judge of the Third Circuit. Specifi-
cally, she held that federal and state laws that impose damages for disclosure of
illegally intercepted communications could not constitutionally be applied to
media and other defendants who did not participate in or authorize the illegal
interception. The opinion concluded that "the government's significant interest
in protecting privacy is not sufficient to justify the serious burdens the damages
provisions ... place on free speech."4 6
Another respected civil libertarian, Louis Pollak, wrote the dissent.47 In one
sense, he concluded that the privacy concerns did justify restrictions on free
speech. In another sense, though, he concluded that these privacy concerns
could themselves be viewed as an integral aspect of free speech. Thus, Judge
Pollak brings us back full circle to the point I made earlier about the extent to
which privacy and free speech are mutually reinforcing, or complementary,
rights. It is illuminating to quote the pertinent portion of Judge Pollak's opinion,
which in turn quotes another respected jurist, Stanley Fuld:
[T]he First Amendment values of free speech and press are among the values
most cherished in the American social order .... In the case at bar, however,
the First Amendment values on which defendants take their stand are coun-
tered by privacy values ... that are of comparable-indeed kindred-
dimension. Three decades ago the late Chief Judge Fuld of the New York
Court of Appeals put the matter well... in words that the Supreme Court has
quoted with approval: "The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to
prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it
shields the man who wants to speak or publish when others wish him to be
quiet. There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomitant
freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as
freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect."
4 8
Lest I sound too enthusiastic about Judge Pollak's dissenting opinion, I
hasten to add that the ACLU filed an amicus brief in support of the Bartnicki
45. See Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), vacated and remanded, 69 U.S.L.W.
3748 (U.S. May 29, 2001) (mem.).
46. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 129 (3d Cir. 1999).
47. See id. (Pollak, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 136 (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968)).
2114 [Vol. 89:2103
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND FREE SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE
media defendants in the Supreme Court. We argue that the prohibition on
disclosure intrudes upon the press's editorial autonomy and also is a content-
based restriction on speech, therefore triggering strict scrutiny. While preserving
the privacy of confidential communications is clearly an interest of compelling
importance, we maintain that two types of measures can adequately promote
that interest while being less restrictive of free speech rights: first, more
vigorous enforcement of the prohibition against illegal interception of communi-
cations; and second, the increasingly available technological solutions to the
problem of wireless security.
Although the ACLU supports the Bartnicki media defendants, I should note
that the ACLU lawyers and others who have participated in debates about this
case all view it as difficult, and that there are differing opinions among us.
While there is a consensus in terms of our bottom-line position in this particular
case, in light of all the facts and circumstances, there is much less of a
consensus about the appropriate analysis, rationale, and general governing
principles concerning tensions between free speech and privacy in general, in
similar but distinguishable situations. For example, some especially staunch free
speech advocates think that there should be a bright-line rule completely
exonerating any truthful publication, at least where the published material
relates to a matter of public concern-even when the information is obtained
through an illegal wiretap. On the other hand, because the ACLU always has
opposed wiretapping as an inherent violation of fundamental privacy rights,
some especially staunch privacy proponents believe that information obtained
through illicit wiretaps should not be permitted to be published, in order to deter
the interception of this material.
I welcome any guidance from this Symposium's participants about principled
guidelines that might aid our future advocacy in favor of both cherished rights,
privacy and free expression, to the maximum extent possible.
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